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Abstract—This paper focuses on the security aspect of RPL 
(Routing Protocol for Low-power and lossy network) by 
introducing a new type of threat – the topology attack, which 
changes the node operation for breaking the optimised network 
topology, and designing a specification-based IDS for detecting it. 
We present two novel RPL attacks of this type: the rank attack 
and local repair attack. We also propose an IDS architecture 
using network monitor backbone, and describe its monitoring 
mechanisms through a RPL finite state machine implemented in 
each monitor node. We show that our system can effectively 
detect these routing operation threats with a reasonable 
overhead.  
Keywords: RPL; topology attack; rank attack; local repair 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
RPL is an underlying protocol for 6LoWPAN, an IETF 
promising standard to bring the ubiquitous ideal vision to real 
life. Maintaining a reasonable performance for RPL is a crucial 
issue for making this standard to be public accepted. However, 
6LoWPAN devices have weak secured nature, and the network 
suffers from many routing security threats coming from both 
the external and internal attackers. There are few proposed 
solutions for RPL security, and most of them focus on using 
cryptography to secure the RPL control messages. 
Cryptography solutions, nevertheless, cannot protect the 
network from internal attackers if the encryption keys are 
compromised. Internal attackers can control the 
communication and downgrade the network performance by 
using the compromised nodes. Intrusion detection system (IDS) 
is an effective approach for monitoring network behavior for 
early detecting those malicious behaviours. The three most 
widely used approaches in IDS are misused, anomaly-based 
and specification-based. Misuse solutions needs to define 
attack signatures, so they are not favored in RPL security 
because the attacks in this environment are not well-defined. 
Anomaly-based approaches are based on monitoring the node 
performance to define a threshold for differentiating 
compromised or benign nodes. However, working with 
maximum performance does not necessarily mean the genuine 
behaviours, because the compromised nodes can break the 
optimized topology first then work like normal and still 
downgrade network performance. There is a kind of attack that 
changes the node operation to not follow the routing protocol 
to create bad topology. Anomaly-based solutions will fail on 
detecting such kind because they do not consider the node 
operations. Specification-based IDS is the only suitable 
solution for monitoring inside the node operations to guarantee 
that this node follows all the routing rules and provides an 
optimized topology.  
In this paper, we introduce a new kind of attack that 
damages the optimal network topology by breaking protocol 
operations. We present two novel routing operation attacks in 
RPL: the rank and local repair attack. We then design a 
network monitoring architecture and a RPL specification-based 
IDS with a finite state machine for malicious checking in each 
monitor node. This is, to the best of our knowledge, the first 
specification-based IDS for RPL. We show that our solution 
can detect the RPL routing operation threats, and consume only 
a reasonable overhead. The rest of the paper is organized as 
following: Section II presents some background of RPL and its 
topology attacks while Section III reviews the security 
countermeasures and Section IV introduces our solution 
design. Section V provides some evaluation analysis about the 
detection ability of the system whereas Section VI concludes 
the paper.  
II. RPL TOPOLOGY ATTACKS 
The RPL architecture is a combination of multiple 
Destination Oriented Directed Acyclic Graphs (DODAG) 
networks, each of these can be considered like many wireless 
sensor devices connected to a DODAG root. Those roots are 
connected together and to the Internet through a backbone or 
transit link. The main RPL focus is to make the routing 
topology to be auto-optimized, while prevent any loops from 
happening [1]. The loop prevention mechanism is based on the 
Rank concept to show the node relationship.  Each node needs 
to compute a rank which based on collected information from 
its neighbours. Every node except the sink needs to choose a 
preferred parent, and the rank of a parent must always not be 
larger than the rank of its children. The auto-optimised 
topology is maintained by the local and global repair 
mechanism which will fix any broken link.  
Since RPL devices have the weak secure nature without the 
tamper-resistant ability, attackers can capture the node, extract 
all the cryptography information and utilize it for working 
legally in the network. Once capturing the nodes, attackers can 
also implement malicious code inside to break some routing 
operation rules. This kind of changing is difficult to detect 
because the inside processing of a node is only checked by 
itself. Its neighbours unaware of the change and if the protocol 
is continued to process while some nodes do not follow its 
rules, the optimized topology can be broken. Attacks are even 
more dangerous and difficult to be detected when the malicious 
nodes cooperated. RPL is vulnerable to this kind of attack 
because it has many strict rules to help to maintain the 
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optimized state. In the following part, we analyze two 
examples of the topology attacks that an adverse may utilize to 
interfere with network performance: the rank attack and the 
local repairing attack. Both of them aim at changing the inside 
operation of the nodes for breaking the optimized network 
topology.  
A. Rank attack 
RPL has a strict rule about the node rank that “rank strictly 
increases in the Downstream direction and strictly decreases in 
the Upstream direction”. Considering a scenario when the 
source - node 1 sends the packet to the destination - node N 
through intermediate nodes 2, 3, 4, …, N-1. Assume the rank 
of these N nodes are R1, R2, R3, …, Rn-1, Rn consequently. The 
rank rule states that if node 1 sends packets upward to node N 
then the condition R1 ≥ R2 ≥ R3 ≥ … Rn-1 ≥ Rn must be 
satisfied; or if the route is downward then R1 ≤ R2 ≤ R3 ≤ … 
Rn-1 ≤ Rn must be satisfied. The senders and receivers along the 
route have the responsibility to check these conditions and 
inform any broken of this rule by setting the Rank-Error bit in 
the RPL Packet Information [2]. The rank attack is easy to be 
implemented by simply skipping the rank checking function in 
the compromised nodes. This attack is difficult to be revealed 
because it does not need to spoof anything, and most of the 
behaviours of the compromised nodes look like normal from 
their neighbours’ point of view. Once the rank rule is broken, 
the consequence can be (i) un-optimized path is created (ii) if 
the attack is initiated in the route discovery phase, some 
optimized paths may be disrupted, which mean they exist but 
will never be discovered, and (iii) a loop can be created without 
any detection. These consequences definitely downgrade the 
network performance in many important Quality of Service 
aspects, such as throughput and delay. 
B. Local repair attack 
A node in RPL can start the local repair progress in two 
following ways [2]: The first way is the poisoning mechanism 
by changing its rank to infinitive and broadcast this rank to all 
of its neighbours. Those neighbours once receive and update 
the rank information of that node may need to find a new 
parent towards the root. The second way to do local repair is to 
change DODAG ID value of the node. This metric is unique to 
each DODAG and show what LoWPAN the node belongs to. 
A node changes its DODAG ID means that it left that DODAG 
and now belongs to a new DODAG neighbour. As a result, all 
of its child nodes need to do a local repair to find for a new 
preferred parent.  In RPL, the node is supposed to only do local 
repair if the links towards its parent list are all broken. 
However, the adverse can make the node change its DODAG 
ID or broadcast infinitive rank frequently without any reason. 
Only the node itself can verify the state of the link to its 
preferred parent, so when the other neighbours look at a 
frequently local repair made by a node, they cannot justify 
whether that node is benign or not. Every time a local repair 
happens, network topology will need to be updated. This will 
cost resources and degrade network operation. In case of a 
node changing its DODAG ID, it is even worse because that 
node can create local repair in at least two DODAG. 
III. RELATED SECURITY  COUNTERMEASURES  
      There are not many works presented on securing RPL. 
IETF RPL specification [2] proposed mechanisms for securing 
RPL control messages such as DODAG Information Objective 
(DIO), Destination Advertisement Object (DAO), DODAG 
Information Solicitation (DIS). This solution uses symmetric 
key and public key cryptography to secure the control 
messages but not consider the establishment and maintenance 
of the keys. Tsao [3] specified the normal behaviours of  RPL 
control messages such as DIO, DAO, DIS and the control 
information place in the user data flow of IPv6 Flow Label. 
IDS is an essential approach for monitoring and preventing 
RPL from internal attacks. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, there is no proposed IDS for RPL. Specification-
based approach is the only direction that can detect the threats 
by profiling and monitoring node operations. The main 
techniques of specification-based IDS are finite state machine 
transitions, machine learning for pattern recognition and 
statistical analysis to derive automatically the program 
specifications [4, 5]. Literature also presented specifications-
based IDS on some protocols working in a similar environment 
with 6LoWPAN such as AODV  [6], OLSR [7] and CoP [8]. 
IV. SPECIFICATION-BASED IDS FOR RPL  
A. Monitoring architecture  
We assume that during the setting up of the network, a back 
bone of monitor nodes (MN) is also created and satisfy the 
following requirements (i) the number of MNs should be 
minimal (ii) all the MNs are trusted and have enough ability to 
perform the additional monitor works (iii) that backbone can 
cover the whole network, which mean every node in the 
network is in the range of at least one MN. After that backbone 
is set up, a monitor node will sniff the communication from its 
neighbours, which includes its parent and child nodes. MN will 
make an entry for each of its neighbours to store monitoring 
data for that node. The monitoring data are (i) Object ID and its 
rank (ii) Preferred parent ID and its rank (iii) Number of 
topology change/set up in a period of time. All of these are 
monitored and updated by analysing the DIO messages from 
the object. When MN discovers a node working maliciously, 
but it cannot decide whether that node is an attacker, it can 
request other MNs to collect more information for decision 
support. Figure 1 shows an example of this architecture. Node 
9 and 13 are the two MNs. Node 13 cover node 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, in 
which node 5 is its preferred parent, node 2 is its child while 1, 
3, 6 is its neighbours. Node 6 is double monitored by MN 9 
and 13 and its information can be cross checked.   
 
Figure 1. Monitoring node architecture 
This design only requires a reasonable overhead because 
most of the overhead is from the set up phase, which cost only 
one time per network lifetime, or from the cross-checking, 
which is optional and only be raised if the possibility that a 
threat happens is high. The monitor node only sniffs 
transmission among its neighbours so it does not add any more 
communication overhead. 
B. Finite State Machine for RPL 
A finite state machine will be implemented in each monitor 
node for monitoring the behaviour flow of the object. The state 
machine can be shown in figure 2. There are four main normal 
states: the start when monitored object join the network, the 
topology setup/change, the sending and receiving control 
messages. When a monitor node first hears a DIO message 
from the object, its FSM will move from the start to the 
topology setup/change state. The monitor node then extracts all 
the necessary information from that DIO in a specific entry for 
the object in its monitoring table. From the topology 
change/setup state, depend on hearing the object sending or 
receiving control messages, FSM moves to sending or 
receiving state respectively. If FSM detects any change in the 
DIO message related to the preferred parent, change in the 
DODAG ID or the rank goes to infinitive, it will move back to 
the topology setup/change state.  
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Figure 2. Finite State Machine for RPL operation 
FSM has two states to indicate the malicious behaviours of 
the routing operations, which come from the topology 
setup/change state. When checking rank information in the 
received DIO, if a monitor node detects any child/parent 
relationship that breaks the rank rule, FSM will move to the 
invalid topology state. If the FSM goes to the topology 
setup/change more frequently so that the number of changing 
exceeds a threshold, it will go to the suspicious topology 
attack, which assume that the operation of the monitored node 
break the stable of network topology.  
V. DETECTING THE ATTACKS  
A. Rank attack detection 
We consider a scenario when two malicious nodes are 
cooperated to break the rank rule. With our monitoring system, 
there should be a monitor node that covers the malicious node 
with lower rank. This monitored object needs to provide its 
information regarding its rank and the parent’s rank. If none of 
these two nodes forge the rank information, then the monitor 
node will reveal a fact that the rank of the parent is higher than 
the rank of the child, which breaks the rank rule. Rank attack is 
therefore detected. On the other hand, if the malicious nodes 
forge their rank information and use those fake ranks, there is 
no breaking in the rank rule, however, because the malicious 
nodes change between their real rank and forged ranks, the 
monitoring system can capture this change and suspect about 
their behaviours. The monitor node then can start cross 
checking to reveal the attackers.    
B. Local repair attack  
Any node behaviour that leads to a local repair will be 
recorded in the monitor node. The number of the local repair 
that each object caused is calculated from this information. If 
there are too many local repairs that exceed a threshold then the 
monitoring system will raise an alarm for local repair attack.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we discuss the RPL topology attacks by 
breaking node operations. We introduce two new attacks of this 
type: the rank and local repair attack. We also propose a 
specification-based IDS with finite state machine design to 
prevent those threats. The idea of a specification-based IDS is 
to build manually an abstract of the normal network operation, 
and detect the malicious behaviours that break those 
specifications. This research is the first attempt in specifying 
the RPL operation in order to protect the routing operation 
attacks. We design the architecture of a monitoring system for 
RPL and the information that it should collect to analyse. We 
show that the system can detect effectively these RPL topology 
attacks with a reasonable overhead. Our next target is to 
implement this system in simulation environments such as 
Contiki, and analysis its effectiveness. We also interested in 
expanding and improving the FSM to develop a more robust 
specification-based IDS for that protocol. 
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